They have little link to London except they list their shares there – and even then, the UK may be just one of the countries where they have a primary quotation. The Investec banking group now has duel London-Johannesburg listing but most of its shareholders are South Africa and it still makes three-quarters of its profits there.

But it is in cosmopolitan company in joining the FTSE. There is Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Shell in the top 100 alongside Irish-based WPP plus groups such as Kazakhmys, Fresnillo and Eurasian Natural Resources whose only connection with London is the Tube from Heathrow.

Nor do the companies represent the UK economy. Nevermind that 60 per cent of British workers are with small firms that are not, by definition, in the index of the 100 largest quoted companies, almost a fifth of the FTSE companies are in oil and gas with another 15 per cent in basic materials. Even after the crash, a quarter are financial-service firms.

Manufacturing makes up just 8 per cent of the FTSE 350 – and much less of the top 100 – which is less than half its contribution to the economy.

Just three companies – including two oil giants - account for a quarter of the FTSE 100’s value, five companies make up a third and the top ten constitute almost 50 per cent, leaving the other 90 per cent, now including Investec, to make up the other half.  The biggest company is more than 60 timers larger than the hundredth.

This wouldn’t matter if it was not that so many investors regard the FTSE 100 as a representation of UK business – an equity stake that reflects UK earnings and is free of currency distortions. Pensions funds buy into it through tracker funds and derivatives based on the index. And ironically, it is the unintentional overseas exposure that they gain that has probably provided the stability and growth to their investments in recent years.

Gordon’s Brown has written to the Financial Reporting Council calling for the corporate governance code to include a clause forcing companies to say what they are doing to promote women. That is on top of an Equality Bill that permits positive discrimination by companies and recommendations on sex discrimination from the Equality & Human Rights Commission.

“If we do not see a dramatic change in the composition of company boards in the future, we will need to consider taking more action,” threatens Brown.

You can’t fault his sentiments but you can argue with the tactics. The Government Equalities Office commissioned a poll to coincide with this onslaught on male-dominated boards. It found that 80 per cent of the public think a balanced management team better understands its customers, 61 per cent think business is losing out on talent, 78 per cent do not think men are better at running companies, etc, etc, etc.

The money wasted on the poll is beaten only by the statements of the obvious it produced. The surprise is not that 80 per cent think balanced managements are good but that 20 per cent think otherwise - or that 39 per cent think business is not neglecting talent in ignoring women or 22 per cent apparently think men may be best at running companies.

And as the government poll found 43 per cent of us think investment banks should employ an equal balance of men and women, do 57 per cent not think that? Nevermind what it has do with the general public who City firms employ.

The poll suggests the barrier to women reaching the top is present in the public mind as much as in the boardroom – and possibly in the female half of the public that was polled.

There should be no barriers based on gender. Positions should be open to anyone and offered on the basis of merit. But no-one should be forced to take a job they do not want or employ someone who is not their first choice.

All women should have the chance to climb the corporate ladder – or chase civil-service or cabinet positions – but it may be that not all want to take it. Forcing companies to discriminate positively or give preferential treatment is not the way to achieve equality: if companies want to deny themselves the best talent, that is their business. No one, of either gender, is owed a job.

The financial regulators are similarly right in planning now to put a levy on banks during the next boom to provide the funds for rescuing them when they collapse in the next bust.

Even if a European Monetary Fund, an EMF, could be established quickly there is no point: if Greece could afford to join it would not need to. That may apply to some other Mediterranean countries too.

But part of the wrangling will be the cost of joining. Should a fund be insurance-based, with those countries deemed the greatest risks contributing most? Apart from larger contributions increasing that country’s risk, the ability to forecast which members would need to withdraw funds at future dates would be both contentious and difficult.

If members are allowed to borrow only what they have contributed then an EMF would be merely an enforced savings scheme and would leave a lot of capital tied up idly. The better use of a fund would be to lend money to the troubled member, but to require repayment in full, with interest – and not to get soft and write-off the loans later.

That is how the International Monetary Fund, has operated since it was set up in 1944, but as the world has the IMF, why does it need an EMF too? The suspicion is that a European fund would be there to give unjustified aid to its chums when the IMF has wisely refused.

There is already a European Central Bank, funded by all euro members (and in which the Bank of England is a shareholder), that could help troubled countries if its constitution permitted. Perhaps the EMF’s supporters hope their fund could borrow from the ECB, IMF or the latter’s in-house lender, the World Bank?

Who would join the EMF? The 16 euro member countries presumably, but should the other 11 EU members, including the UK, be expected to join? Asking them for a contribution seems unfair when the rigidity of the euro is part of the problem of countries such as Greece. Britain has avoided having insurance by having a currency to devalue.

An EMF is so far away on the political and economic horizon it may not be ready for the next financial crisis either, but instead of creating rescue funds, European politicians could do better to concentrate on preventing countries getting into trouble. Tight policing of the euro rules for economic ratios could have avoided the current pressures on Greece and other countries. Prevention is better than cure.

Why shouldn’t wealthy Parisian bankers coming to London pay UK taxes on their earnings over here while their investments at home would be taxed at French rates. And a British engineer accepting a post on the Middle East would pay local taxes on his income there but still pay UK taxes on any savings or rental income from his or her assets left in this country.

The non-dom status effectively allows that to happen, though countries are increasingly selling the privilege by demanding a small part of the taxes on foreign income that they are forfeiting. The UK price is £30,000 a year to remain non-dom after seven years in Britain.

And without the non-dom facility, the global mobility of labour would be much reduced. There would be fewer foreign bankers and businessmen in Britain and a smaller number of UK professionals working abroad.

Naturally people will arrange their affairs to minimize their tax liabilities, but it is better that Britain collects some tax from the foreign workers based in the UK than collecting none. And – in most cases - it is better that foreign executives come to the UK than for them to take their skills and spending power to some other overseas country.

The concept of taxing money where it is earned is not unreasonable, just as turnover taxes such as VAT put a levy on money where it is spent.

Nor need capital flows be controlled to allow this tax basis to work. The engineers who earn money in the Middle East and pay low local income taxes should be allowed to bring their savings to Britain tax-free so long as they pay UK tax on the interest, dividends or profits earned on the investment in the UK. If the savings are invested abroad, that would not be a UK matter unless the capital or income was remitted to the UK and invested here. Equally, if foreign workers invest their money in Britain they would pay UK taxes: if they send it abroad they would not.

There is political capital for both parties in making accusations about their supporters who have non-dom status, but the debate would be better served if they asked what is wrong with people – especially non-political people – choosing to pay tax where they earn it instead of suggesting this is a social evil.

But in issuing a warning that profits may have been understated Hg is presumably telling us it got even more of a bargain than it expected when it backed the £179m buyout.

The deal was completed on 29 December 2009. A month earlier Goldshield’s then chairman, former government drugs czar and ex-police chief constable Keith Hellawell, issued accounts showing pre-tax profits up 56 per cent for the half-year to September on sales 7.4 per cent higher.

“I am pleased to report half-year profits are in line with expectations,” he said, crediting changes in systems and management efficiency and effectiveness.

But Hellawell gave his own profits warning: “It is highly unlikely to continue to have the same level of impact on the bottom line in years to come”. Goldshield spent 2009 coping with bids by its former chief executive and Hg and the chairman blamed those distractions when reporting: “To continue on an upward path of sales and profit growth we need to invest in new products. I am disappointed to report that we have failed to do so during the period under review.”

You can admire his honesty but you have to wonder what the new owner has found to make it admit that during a normal review of accounting systems “Hg discovered evidence suggesting that Goldshield may have understated its reported profits over a number of years.”

The statement of directors’ responsibilities signed by the old board on 27 November said the financial position and profits gave a true and fair view and although the interim figures were unaudited, auditors Grant Thornton reviewed the figures and found them satisfactory.

Goldshield is probably remembered for a long-running price-fixing inquiry by the Serious Fraud Office that came to nothing. There is no suggestion that is in anyway related to Hg’s warning.

Perhaps Hg is worried that discovering extra profits could mean paying extra tax but more must be said. If profits had been overstated there would be inquiries and potential recriminations: just because they were understated, the discrepancy should not be buried.

For Lloyds Banking Group and RBS they were rescue refinancings, just like the then-record £6bn raised by BT seven years ago. Even last year’s £8bn issue by Rio Tinto was to repay debt from past acquisitions, not to finance new investment.

So it is encouraging to see capital markets are open for companies with a positive story to tell, not simply for those trying to undo past damage. But it is discouraging to see that Prudential has not used this strength to reduce the costs of raising its cash.

The terms of the issue will not be know for a couple of months after the announcement of the deal – which is why sellers were able to knock the share price by 20 per cent in little more than 24 hours after it was revealed. But it will almost certainly be at a deep discount even to that deeply depressed price – not only because financial institutions have long gone for that, rather than pricing new equity 20 per cent below market level – but because no risks can be taken with a share price that volatile.

But if it is deeply discounted it should not need underwriting – or the risk of shares being left with underwriters should be so minimal that the fee is negligible too. Yet Pru is estimated to be spending $600m on underwriting fees and another $400m on advisory and legal costs.

A conspiracy theorist would say that the Pru, as the biggest investor in UK equities and thus an underwriter of other companies’ rights issues, has a vested interest in keeping fees high. The insurance giant earned healthy fees for sub-underwriting those mega issues from the banks last year.

But those troubled banks were desperate for capital and cash and in no position to bargain with investment bankers over fees or to shop around for better deals. Pru can negotiate and should. If nothing else, there should be a discount for the scale of its deal: legal work on a $1.5bn issue is the same as for a $15bn issue, for instance.

The Pru’s last rights issue was eight years ago and was received badly by the market because the company had no clear use for the proceeds. The chairman resigned over the mess. That issue was for just £1bn however; the fees alone for this one are $1bn and it would be a shame if an even bigger mess ends up claiming another top scalp.

But how could a board continue in office knowing that the owners of 64 per cent of its shares had wanted to accept a bid? Why should the owners of 36 per cent have shares with almost twice the votes of those who want to sell?

The Takeover Panel has been forced to start a consultation on how its code could be modified because of these criticisms, but to end the principle of majority decisions would rip up everything on which the code is based.

Both Carr and Mandelson claim to be against protectionism – what else could a business secretary say. But that is all that their proposals are.

Britain has a Competition Commission to protect the consumer interest during mergers. If politicians want an Employment Commission to consider the effect on jobs or a National Interest Commission to stop foreigners buying Britain’s commercial heritage, they should say so, but they cannot leave that job to the Takeover Panel or to directors.

Mandelson is effectively asking directors to do that though. He talks of blocking executives from selling a company without considering the interests of employees, suppliers and the corporate brand. That last clause is a direct appeal to the gallery that thinks a chocolate brand more important than, say, an unheard of engineering group or unloved water company.

Demanding that bid advisers disclose their fees in advance makes more sense (they do it for fund raisings) but forcing fund managers to reveal the incentives they receive to hold shares long term is too woolly. However, these are measures a business secretary can implement: if he wants them, try doing them.

Mandelson has not backed Carr’s call to remove the votes from short-term holders such as hedge funds but the two agree on reducing the threshold for divulging share shakes during a bid from 1 to 0.5 per cent.

That would be within the Takeover Panel’s powers, even if it found no support for such a move last year. Also in its power would be shortening the bid timetable, as Mandelson suggests, but that could make hostile takeovers easier because the bidder has time to plot before pouncing while a surprised target can only start to muster its defences afterward.

Rules based on one high-profile confectionery takeover would be bad rules. Cadbury got taken over because it had been badly run and a bidder was prepared to pay well. Putting barriers in the way of bids not only protects British brands, it protects bad management.

Both major parties have plans for getting the economy back on the rails. They argue about degree and timing but they are both pointing in the same direction. Yet the danger of an inconclusive election is that whoever is declared winner does nothing rather than something.

A hung parliament is when the party with most seats does not have an overall majority and has to form a coalition with a minority party or do a series of deals with smaller parties or individual opposition MPs. The governing party cannot tolerate any of its own supporters voting against it. The government is thus shackled, unable to do anything controversial that would not have the support of some of its rivals and becomes beholden to small groups with valuable votes, introducing policy to please just that handful of MPs.

It is not a way to progress a programme to reduce the UK’s spending deficit, nevermind reduce its debt. Investors would take fright at the lack of progress and danger of diversion, selling the pound and demanding higher interest rates. Stockmarkets would likely be hit too. For business, that means higher import costs, higher borrowing costs and difficulty in raising equity capital as well as an economy that fails to deliver growth.

If one party thought it could struggle through for five years without a majority of MPs it might just seek to reach a consensus with the main opposition party to produce a co-ordinated economic policy that satisfied the markets. This need not be a coalition or government of national unity: a place in cabinet or just on cabinet committees for opposition politicians might be enough.

But if the party that forms the government after the election thinks it can hold another poll that might result in a majority, then the prospect of shared government is nil. Both parties would want to remain independent pending the next election – and neither would advance tough policies for solving the economic problems for fear of scaring off voters. Markets would react negatively to the prospect of several more months on non-government.

Britain – business as well as government - would be in limbo until the second election – which might be no more decisive.

For those with longer memories, the 1964 general election returned Labour with only a minimal majority and prime minister Harold Wilson held another poll after 18 months; in 1974 the Conservative Edward Heath tried to hang on as prime minister with a minority government but failed to gain Liberal support and handed the reins back to Wilson who held a second election after just eight months. Wilson won, but Labour had to do a deal with the Liberals to stay, uneasily, in power.

The other year of two general elections was exactly 100 years ago. The first poll gave the Conservatives 272 seats and the Liberals 274 but with minority parties holding 124 seats. In the second election, in December, the Tories won 271 seats and the Liberals 272 with 127 other seats. The Liberals formed a government under Asquith but on each occasion the Conservatives polled more votes, despite winning slightly fewer seats.

History does not repeat itself neatly, but the century-old precedent showed how messy a non-outcome could be for politics and country. If nothing else, the prospect of a hung parliament in 2010 should encourage all parties to redouble their efforts to become an outright winner.

But if the top directors limit their pay when other tiers of management continue to collect their rewards, there will be a bunching of remuneration that gives little financial incentive to accept promotion. It might even be that deputies who are free to collect a bonus are paid more than their boss who cannot.

Companies must have a staircase of remuneration to accompany their hierarchy of management. Chief executives must be paid more than marketing directors, who earn more than the head of sales, who in turn receive more than their deputies, whose pay should exceed the regional sales heads, whose earnings should be higher than the local reps – all the way down.

Curbing top pay upsets that natural order and has been done only to kowtow to shareholders, governments and a baying press and public. Barclays’ chief executive and president are waiving their bonuses so that £2.7bn can be paid in bonuses to other staff. RBS’s chief has volunteered to forego his bonus so that the state-owned bank can pay £1.3bn to other employees. Now Lloyds’ CEO feels obliged to sacrifice his bonuses for the second year running.

Exactly why Eric Daniels at Lloyds was entitled to a maximum £2.33m bonus is a different matter. He may have done well in 2009 by making a record rights issue to save the bank but it was his takeover of HBoS the previous year that made rescue necessary.

But Stephen Hester can take no blame for RBS’s problems. He was recruited as CEO after the crash to save the bank, so why should he be punished because of its problems when he is the supposed solution. There is no fairness in promising him high rewards if he succeeds then pressurising him to reject them when he has joined.

It may well be that all bankers are still vastly overpaid, but the cuts should go all the way down – not start and stop at the top.

When the “Liverpool Six” economists tried to force the Tory government to adopt a more monetarist stance in 1992 it required only half a dozen of them. By the time a group of German economists sought to delay European monetary union in 1998 there were 155 signing the letter. At present some 350 have put their name to the proposed “Robin Hood tax” on financial transactions.

But that fails to beat the record set in 1983 when these mass economist lobbies started with 364 signing a letter claiming Mrs Thatcher was veering too far to the right. Like most subsequent mass missives from economists who are mainly academic, that letter was ignored by the target of the lobbying.

The latest volley of signatures started with 20 economists writing to the Sunday Times telling the UK government to start spending cuts immediately; days later more than five dozen signed two letters to the Financial Times calling for cuts to be delayed. The letters roughly reflect the views of Britain’s two main political parties.

It is good that the country’s future is being debated but 60 does not necessarily trounce 20 on this issue. Quality counts as well as quantity, so both groups are competing to include Nobel prizewinners, former Bank of England deputy governors and interest-rate committee members of ex-heads of the US Fed. Professors rank above fellows, readers and mere lecturers – but there are remarkably few signatories in either camp from commerce rather than academia.

Some names inevitably come round regularly on these multi-signature letters. Joseph Stiglitz’s pen had barely left the Robin Hood petition before it endorsed the FT call to defer cuts: David Blanchflower was one of nine economists writing to The Times just days after his FT letter.

And what does it all prove? That economists can circulate a letter among themselves – though whether all the signers agree with every word must be doubted. For the intended readers of these shows of economic strength the moral must be to read the argument rather than the celebrity authors. Nevermind how many economists it takes to change a policy, it takes only one person to state a sensible case.